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Federal Financial Exposure to 
Natural Catastrophe Risk
J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
4.1    Introduction
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
passed supplemental appropriations of over $26 billion for redevelopment, 
clean up, and aid to attack victims and their families. By the standards of 
the time, the nature and extent of the expenditures were unprecedented. 
However, the new standard would be broken only a few years later, when 
Congress appropriated emergency funds for over $80 billion in disaster assis-
tance in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and three other hurricanes, 
which all occurred in one four-  month period.
Viewed in the context of federal disaster policy over the last century, the 
responses to September 11 and Hurricane Katrina ﬁ  t well with a long-  term 
trend of a continuously increasing federal role in disaster assistance (e.g., 
Moss 1999, 2002). Over twenty years ago, Kunreuther and Miller (1985) 
observed:
The role of the federal government with respect to hazards has been 
changing . . . there has also been a realization that government has been 
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viewed as the protector of risks in ways that would have been unthinkable 
50 years ago. Even 30 years ago there was a reluctance by local communi-
ties to rely on federal relief for recovery purposes.
Reactions to more recent disasters have revealed a telling shift in political 
sentiments at the state and local level. The response of Missouri Governor 
Mel Carnahan to calls for ﬁ  scal restraint in the aftermath of the Mississippi 
River ﬂ  ooding in 19931 (“This is not the time for debating the ﬁ  ne points 
of long-  term policy!”) seems more representative of local opinion today. 
Moreover, development has been steadily increasing in catastrophe-  prone 
areas, so the property at risk is far greater now than at any time in the past.2 
Indeed, the subsidization of high-  risk areas embedded in federal disaster 
policy has almost certainly encouraged development in those areas, thereby 
increasing federal exposure.3
The combination of rising standards for federal assistance and the grow-
ing private exposure suggests that the “stealth entitlement” of federal 
disaster assistance has grown large enough to merit a deeper assessment. 
Following Governor Carnahan’s exhortation, we make no attempt in this 
chapter to dissect the “ﬁ  ner points” of public disaster policy. Instead, we 
set ourselves the more concrete objective of assessing the federal exposure. 
In other words, if we take as given the current generosity of federal disaster 
policy and the current state of development in catastrophe- prone areas, what 
is the taxpayer’s expected annual bill for disaster- related expenditures? And 
what could the bill be in a bad year?
The numbers we estimate in answering the foregoing questions are sig-
niﬁ  cant. Based on the historical relationship between catastrophe damages 
and federal expenditures, together with prospective assessments of future 
catastrophe damages from (a) a leading catastrophe modeling ﬁ  rm, Applied 
Insurance Research (AIR), and (b) the projection of historical catastrophe 
loss data from Property Claims Services (PCS), we estimate the average 
expected bill for disaster assistance related to hurricanes, earthquakes, thun-
derstorms, and winter storms to be about $20 billion a year. In a bad year, 
corresponding to a catastrophic event of severity expected only once every 
century, the bill could exceed $100 billion. Conservative methods guide both 
estimates, so more liberal assumptions (e.g., extrapolating recent growth in 
federal generosity to the future instead of assuming no change) would yield 
considerably higher estimates.
To get a sense of the signiﬁ  cance of these ﬁ  gures in relation to other, 
more familiar obligations of the Federal Government, we take the expected 
1. Cited by Moss (1999, 259).
2. For example, the amount of property exposed to hurricane losses in Florida grew by 27 
percent to $2.5 trillion between 2004 and 2007. See Hartwig (2008).
3. This is an important moral hazard issue that is beyond the scope of the present chapter. It 
would be useful to explore the link between federal disaster policy and development in future 
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annual expense over the next seventy-  ﬁ  ve years and compute a net present 
value (NPV) of this “unfunded liability.” Doing so yields a ﬁ  gure between 
$1.2 and $7.1 trillion, depending on assumptions of growth and discount 
rates. For comparison, the trustees of Social Security project a shortfall with 
an NPV of $4.9 trillion over this same horizon.
Even the conservative estimate of $20 billion a year is far higher than 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regular budget for 
disaster relief. Regular appropriations for the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF; 
the main vehicle for federal relief) averaged about $1 billion over the ﬁ  scal 
years from 2001 to 2005, while supplemental appropriations to the Disaster 
Relief Fund averaged $16.5 billion over the same period (GAO 2007). Our 
estimate of future relief spending is accurate enough to allow budgeting for 
disasters in the regular appropriation process.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 oﬀers back-
ground, including details on federal disaster policy. Section 4.3 discusses 
the methodology used for (a) assessing the relationship between federal 
disaster relief and catastrophe damages and (b) estimating the prospective 
distribution of aggregate catastrophe losses for the United States. Section 
4.4 discusses the results, including the eﬀects of modifying assumptions. 
Finally, section 4.5 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications 
of our ﬁ  ndings.
4.2    Background
The Federal Government’s ﬁ  nancial exposure to catastrophic risk stems 
mainly from ad hoc disaster relief distributed to individuals, business, and 
communities; direct exposure of government facilities and service provision 
operations to disasters; and government insurance programs such as the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Program (TRIP). We discuss each of these sources next.
4.2.1    Disaster  Relief
Historically, disaster relief expenditures have been the most signiﬁ  cant 
component of federal catastrophe exposure. One consequence of the seem-
ingly ad hoc nature of the relief is that only a small portion of anticipated 
relief expenditures is contained in the budget. However, although the full 
extent of the federal obligation to assist may not be explicitly enumerated 
by legislation, history suggests that federal action is inevitable after major 
disasters; indeed, assistance seems discretionary in name only. In the words 
of Moss (1999, 334):
Disaster spending has become a political sacred cow. . . . Again and again 
in the aftermath of disasters, representatives from the aﬀected states have 
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received and that the particular nature of their disaster might justify even 
more. Federal catastrophe coverage has thus been subject to a ratcheting-
 up  process.
The Staﬀord Emergency Assistance and Disaster Relief Act of 1988 and 
its antecedents, beginning with the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, guide the 
process for federal relief in the aftermath of catastrophes. The act formally 
requires the Federal Government to oﬀer aid when state and local resources 
are overwhelmed by a major catastrophe. The Staﬀord Act designates FEMA 
to give declaration recommendations to the president after a disaster, and 
the Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-  5 makes the secre-
tary of homeland security “responsible for coordinating Federal resources 
within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terror-
ist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies” (DHS 2006b).
If the president makes a declaration, then FEMA is charged with oversee-
ing the response, both directly and by administering funds to other federal 
agencies. The money comes from the DRF, a “no-  year” account (i.e., any 
dollars appropriated remain available until expended) that receives annual 
appropriations though is largely reliant on supplemental appropriations 
from Congress in the event of major catastrophes.
The other sources of signiﬁ  cant federal spending on disasters are the 
Small Business Administration (SBA), which makes subsidized disaster 
loans to households and businesses, and the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), which dispenses disaster loss funds to farmers. Most funding for 
the SBA is provided through its annual appropriations from Congress. The 
president may make a major disaster declaration or an emergency declara-
tion. The latter is less signiﬁ  cant and aims for federal costs not to exceed $5 
million. If the president makes a more substantial major disaster declara-
tion, some types of available federal aid actually have Staﬀord Act mandated 
ﬂ  oors on the federal share of expenditures. These mandated ﬂ  oors include 
75 percent of eligible costs for “essential assistance” and “debris removal” 
and 100 percent of “housing assistance” (Bea 2006).
4.2.2      Exposures to Federal Facilities and Operations
Federal Government property, such as military bases or Veterans Aﬀairs 
(VA) hospitals, can be susceptible to direct physical damage from catastro-
phes. The Federal Government is also bound to provide certain everyday 
public services, including providing Social Security and Medicare beneﬁ  ts 
and running federal law and order institutions. The prompt resumption 
of these services postdisaster can entail signiﬁ   cantly  higher- than- normal 
operational costs (DHS 2006a).
4.2.3    Insurance  Programs
The US Federal Government plays signiﬁ  cant roles in disaster insurance 
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dential ﬂ  ood insurance (through the NFIP, administered by FEMA); it also 
eﬀectively acts as the country’s largest reinsurer of terrorism risk through 
the TRIP.
The maximum government exposure under the TRIP is laid out by stat-
ute. For 2009 to 2014, the Federal Government is technically liable for up to 
$61.625 billion of terrorism losses, of which some fraction may be recouped 
from the industry.4 To date, no losses have been paid under the TRIP. Of 
course, it is likely that the government’s exposure to terrorism losses is signiﬁ  -
cantly larger than the limits laid out in the TRIP. The government paid out 
approximately $16 billion through the September 11 Victims’ Compensation 
Fund of 2001,5 and pressures for ad hoc payments are likely to develop if a 
terrorist event larger than the $100 billion maximum under the TRIP were 
to occur.
The NFIP boasts about $1.1 trillion in exposures nationally.6 Although it 
is described as a “self- ﬁ  nancing” program, the NFIP has borrowing rights at 
the Treasury when losses exceed its resources. This borrowing authority was 
increased dramatically to $20.8 billion to cover claims following Hurricane 
Katrina. In reality, the NFIP is not self-  supporting and has been criticized 
for leaving a high proportion of ﬂ  ood-  exposed properties uninsured and 
not operating on sound actuarial principles (Cummins 2006; Jenkins 2006). 
Hence, in its present form, the NFIP creates more ﬁ  nancial exposure for the 
Federal Treasury than was envisioned when the program was established.
Other federal insurance programs are also exposed to catastrophe losses. 
Notably, the US Department of Agriculture insured $50 billion of crop 
value in 2006 through the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation 2007).
4.2.4      Additional Sources of Exposure
The aftermath of a major catastrophe will entail signiﬁ  cant economic 
disruption for the aﬀected region and potentially for entire national indus-
tries. Lost jobs, reduced wages, and lower output will all result in a lower tax 
base. This means less federal revenue at a time of increased federal spending. 
Government postdisaster aid will contribute to rebuilding the tax base and 
thus over the long run will lessen the size of indirect exposure created by 
lost tax revenues.
Next, we describe our collection and analysis of data on federal disaster 
expenditures and catastrophe losses.
4. The ﬁ  gure of $61.625 billion is obtained by multiplying the federal coinsurance share for 
2007 to 2014 (85 percent) by $72.5 billion (calculated as the maximum insured loss amount 
of $100 billion less the aggregate industry retention of $27.5 billion). See Dunham and 
Dembeck (2008).
5. Victims’ compensation is not explicitly part of the TRIP, which primarily provides reinsur-
ance for property-  casualty insurance coverages. Data on September 11 victims’ compensation 
are from the following website: http:/  /  www.usdoj.gov/  archive/  victimcompensation/  payments
_deceased.html.
6.  See:  http:/ / www.fema.gov/ business/ nﬁ   p/ statistics/ cy2007cov.shtm.66        J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
4.3    Data  and  Methodology
As noted previously, ad hoc disaster assistance has historically been the 
most important source of direct federal ﬁ  nancial exposure to catastrophes. 
Hence, the remainder of the chapter focuses on that component of exposure. 
We use data on disaster damages and disaster assistance to project the dis-
tribution of expected federal disaster relief expenditures.
There are three basic steps to this analysis. The ﬁ  rst step is to document 
the relationship between catastrophe damages and federal relief expendi-
tures over the period from 1989 to 2008 to estimate the amount of federal 
relief expenditures likely to be “produced” by catastrophe losses. The second 
step is to develop a prospective annual catastrophe loss distribution for the 
United States. The third and ﬁ  nal step, performed in the results section, is 
to apply the estimated ratio of federal relief expenditures to catastrophe 
damages (obtained in the ﬁ  rst step) to the estimated catastrophe damage 
distribution (obtained in the second step) to produce an estimated annual 
federal disaster expenditure distribution for the United States. In this step, 
we also calculate the net present value of the implicit government liability 
arising from catastrophe losses.
4.3.1      Data on the Relationship between Catastrophe 
Loss and Federal Disaster Relief
We combine loss estimates for recent catastrophes with ﬁ  gures for emer-
gency supplemental appropriations to assess the generosity of postdisaster 
federal aid.
We restrict our attention to catastrophes with at least $1 billion in total 
damages (in nominal terms) between 1989 and 2008. The main source for 
total damage estimates is data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s (NOAA) National Climactic Data Center (NCDC) and 
Munich Re (2008, 2009). For each catastrophe, we also identify insured 
losses using the Insurance Services Oﬃce’s (ISO) Property Claims Services 
estimates of privately insured losses and the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram payouts for ﬂ  ood losses under the NFIP. Our selection criterion yields 
sixty- ﬁ  ve events, with the majority being hurricanes and tropical storms. 
Also included are the Loma Prieta, Northridge, and Nisqually earthquakes;7 
the Oklahoma City and September 11 terrorist attacks;8 and various signiﬁ  -
cant ﬂ  oods, storms, and wildﬁ  res.9 As the NOAA relates, unlike with private 
7. Total losses for the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes, described as overall losses 
in the entire aﬀected region, come from Munich Re (2005). Total losses for the Nisqually 
earthquake come from Meszaros and Fiegener (2002).
8. Oklahoma City bombing total damage ﬁ  gure comes from “Governor, Finance Director 
Release Bomb Damage Estimates,” press release from the Oﬃce of Governor Frank Keating. 
Available at: http:/  /  www.state.ok.us/  osfdocs/  nr5-  18.html. September 11 total damage ﬁ  gure 
comes from Bram, Orr, and Rapaport (2002).
9. The NOAA damage estimates are used for all events except the three earthquakes, the 
Oklahoma City bombing, and the September 11 terrorist attacks.Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    6 7
and NFIP insured losses, where every dollar paid out in claims is recorded, 
there is no federal agency tasked with keeping track of total losses resulting 
from catastrophes in the United States.
The NOAA bases its estimates on compilations of statistics from Storm 
Data (NCDC publication), the National Weather Service, the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency, other U.S. government agencies, individual 
state emergency management agencies, state and regional climate centers, 
and insurance industry estimates.10 The ﬁ  gures from the NOAA and the 
others we use for total damages always encompass insured and uninsured 
property damages. For longer duration events, like the 1993 Mississippi 
Flood, droughts, and the earthquakes in our sample, our total loss ﬁ  gures 
include additional economic costs, such as reduced agricultural output. In 
the case of September 11, our total loss ﬁ  gure explicitly includes economic 
costs associated with labor losses. The catastrophes, with the associated 
estimates of total and insured losses, are summarized in ﬁ  gures 4.1 and 4.2, 
where ﬁ  gure 4.1 presents nominal losses and ﬁ  gure 4.2 presents exposure 
and price-  adjusted losses.
The gap between insured and total losses is, of course, signiﬁ  cant. In the 
case of earthquakes, this can be attributed partly to low rates of earthquake 
insurance purchase; similarly, in the case of hurricanes and tropical storms, 
signiﬁ  cant amounts of damage can result from ﬂ  ood—and many house-
holds are either uninsured or only partially insured against ﬂ  ood. Deduct-
ibles, coinsurance, and uninsured damages (e.g., certain “economic costs” 
just described) further contribute to insured losses being substantially below 
our estimate of total losses. For the entire sample of sixty-  ﬁ  ve events, the 
ratio of insured to total loss averages less than 50 percent.
For federal expenditures, we only use ﬁ  gures for emergency supplemental 
appropriations for disaster assistance. This is legislation outside of the regu-
lar annual budgeting process. By our estimates, it accounts for about 80 per-
cent of all federal disaster spending over the period, as we discuss next. The 
money can go to any agency involved in relief, but the majority is provided 
through FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund. The appropriations include funds 
for disaster relief, repair of federal facilities, and hazard mitigation activi-
ties directed towards reducing the eﬀects of future disasters. Not included 
are funds for “counterterrorism, law enforcement, and national security” 
(Murray 2006, p. 2).
It should be noted that the narrow focus on supplemental appropria-
tions ignores some elements of federal ﬁ  nancial exposure to disasters. We 
do not include the budgeted portion of federal disaster spending, which 
covers annual appropriations to FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund, much of the 
10. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration describes their estimates of 
total costs as “the costs in terms of dollars and lives that would not have been incurred had 
the event not taken place. Insured and uninsured losses are included in damage estimates. . . . 
Economic costs are included for wide-  scale, long-  lasting events such as drought” (Lott and 
Ross 2006, p. 1).68        J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
A
Fig. 4.1    Sample of major disasters, nominal losses: A, 1989–1998; B, 1999–2008
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Fig. 4.2    Sample of major disasters, exposure and price adjusted losses: A, 1989–
1998; B, 1999–2008
Note: Insured and total loss ﬁ  gures are adjusted at the state level by our 2008 exposure index. 
This index captures both price-level changes and changes in the size of the housing stock. The 
intent is to estimate the losses a past disaster would cause if it occurred today.
A
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Small Business Administration’s subsidized disaster loans program, and 
reconstruction projects that take place long after the fact. Also not included 
are farm and economic supplemental appropriations through the USDA 
for speciﬁ  cally agricultural disasters, like droughts. Total USDA spending 
on farm disaster aid totaled $54.4 billion over this time horizon.11 We also 
treat NFIP losses as insurance payments and thus exclude them from the 
expenditure data. Of course, a case could be made for including them: while 
the program was close to being self-  ﬁ  nancing through 2004 (at which point 
the NFIP had aggregated only a $200 million deﬁ  cit), the picture looked far 
diﬀerent after record ﬂ  ood losses of the 2005 hurricane season, when the 
cumulative deﬁ  cit of losses over premiums was $4.9 billion. Although the 
deﬁ  cit was reduced to $556 million by 2007, the program is unlikely to be 
self-  supporting in the long run and is badly in need of reform.12
Other special items are also excluded: for example, in the case of the 2001 
terrorist attacks, we have not included the billions in indemniﬁ  cation distrib-
uted through the Victims’ Compensation Fund. In summary, our ﬁ  gures for 
total federal disaster expenditures capture a signiﬁ  cant portion, but not all, 
of the nonbudgeted federal exposure to disaster risk; furthermore, we do not 
attempt to capture exposures that are already reﬂ  ected in the budget.
We draw on the Congressional Research Service analysis of appropria-
tions, the text of the aid legislation, and the date of catastrophe occurrence 
to assign aid to catastrophes.13 The appropriation legislation for disasters is 
usually part of larger bills, and often money is earmarked for multiple recent 
disasters. This fact, combined with the large number of hurricanes in the 
sample, make drawing inferences by catastrophe type diﬃcult. Instead, we 
focus on all the events together.
Figure 4.3 shows the ratio of federal expenditures to total losses. The ratio 
of aid to total losses has a mean of 33 percent and a median of 30 percent, 
and the ratio of aid to uninsured losses has a mean of 101 percent and a 
median of 64 percent. In aggregate, the sixty-  ﬁ  ve events, in values adjusted 
to 2008 exposure and price levels, comprise about $1.1 trillion in total losses, 
$450 billion in insured losses, and $375 billion in emergency spending. These 
aggregated ﬁ  gures are summarized in table 4.1 (panel B).
While there is signiﬁ  cant volatility in the aid ratios across the sample, 
11. Chite (2006). See also Murray and Lindsay (2008).
12. Data are from the FEMA website (http:/  /  www.fema.gov/  business/  nﬁ   p/ statistics/ statscal
.shtm) and represent cumulative premiums minus cumulative losses from 1978 to 2007. State-
ments about FEMA being self- supporting are usually based on a comparison of premiums and 
loss payments. However, this comparison is misleading, because it ignores program expenses. 
Hence, even during periods when premiums exceed loss payments, it is not necessarily the case 
that the program is truly self-  supporting.
13. Appropriation legislation is sometimes explicit in assigning particular dollars to a par-
ticular catastrophe or set of catastrophes, in which case the allocation is straightforward. In 
other cases, legislation appropriates funds for unspeciﬁ  ed catastrophes in the future, in which 
case the date of occurrence is relevant for assignment.Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    7 1
there is some evidence of an increase in generosity over time: emergency 
federal aid/  total losses for 9/  11 and surrounding natural disasters was 62 
percent, even though federal aid did not breach 50 percent of total loss for 
any of the previous events in the sample. Beginning in the 2005 hurricane 
season and continuing through 2008, federal aid averaged 69 percent of 
total losses.14
To obtain a more comprehensive picture of Federal Government spend-
ing on disaster aid, we tabulate annual total federal disaster spending and 
compare it to annual catastrophe losses for ﬁ  scal years from 1989 to 2008. 
The data are presented in table 4.1 and ﬁ  gure 4.4. In addition to the emer-
gency supplemental appropriations previously discussed, we include regular 
annual appropriations to FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund, USDA emergency 
funding for agriculture disasters,15 and the subsidization cost of SBA disaster 
loans.16 Annual catastrophe losses are comprised of NOAA’s billion-  dollar 
weather events; the Loma Prieta, Northridge, and Nisqually earthquakes; 
and the Oklahoma City and September 11 terrorist attacks. Over this span, 
in values adjusted to 2008 exposure and price levels, we observe $512 billion 
Fig. 4.3    Federal aid ratios: 1989 to 2008
Note: Each data point represents a speciﬁ  c disaster in our sample, with labels for the most 
signiﬁ  cant disasters. The “all aid/  losses” ratio is computed after adjusting loss and aid ﬁ  gures 
by our 2008 exposure index. This index captures both price-  level changes and changes in the 
size of the housing stock. This yields a ratio that is not overweighted by recent disasters.
14. It is diﬃcult to distinguish the level of funding for the speciﬁ  c events during this period, 
because the Congressional acts authorizing the payments tended to lump together funding for 
several events rather than distinguishing speciﬁ  c funding per event.
15. Funding for “market loss payments to compensate for low farm commodity prices” is 
excluded.
16. Emergency supplemental ﬁ  gures are adjusted to avoid double counting for some SBA 
disaster loan subsidies and DRF original appropriations.72        J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
Table 4.1  Summary of catastrophe loss and federal aid: 1989 to 2008
Panel A–Values in billions: Nominal $
Aggregate       Mean   Median
Emergency supplemental appropriations by event
Number of events 65   Aid to total loss   33.0%   30.1%
Total loss 510.0 Insured loss to total 45.7% 44.6%
Insured loss (including NFIP) 235.9 Aid to uninsured loss 101.4% 63.8%
NFIP 27.2
Federal aid 240.6
Aid to total loss 47.2%
Insured loss to total 46.3%
Aid to uninsured loss 87.8%
Total federal disaster spending by year




Aid to total loss   52.7%           
Panel B–Values in billions: 2008 exposure and price adjusted $
Aggregate       Mean   Median
Emergency supplemental appropriations by event
Number of events 65 Aid to total loss   33.0%   30.1%
Total loss 1,021.9 Insured loss to total 45.7% 44.6%
Insured loss (including NFIP) 449.9 Aid to uninsured loss 101.4% 63.8%
NFIP 44.2
Federal aid 374.7
Aid to total loss 36.7%
Insured loss to total 44.0%
Aid to uninsured loss 65.5%
Total federal disaster spending by year




Aid to total loss   45.0%            
Note: In panel B, loss ﬁ  gures are adjusted at the state level by our 2008 exposure index. This 
index captures both price-  level changes and changes in the size of the housing stock. The in-
tent is to estimate the losses a past disaster would cause if it occurred today. Federal disaster 
spending is also adjusted using the same index, which yields an aggregate aid ratio that is not 
overweighted by recent disasters.Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    7 3
in total disaster spending and $1.1 trillion in catastrophe losses,17 for a cover-
age ratio of 45 percent. It should be noted that the annual coverage ratios in 
17. The main distinction between the catastrophe losses used in this calculation relative to 
those used previously relates to the inclusion of drought losses. This augmentation is necessary 
due to the inclusion of the USDA expenditures.
Fig. 4.4    Total federal disaster spending: FY1989 to FY2008
Note: In panel B, values are adjusted at the state level by our 2008 exposure index. This index 
captures both price-  level changes and changes in the size of the housing stock. The intent is 
to estimate the spending that would have resulted if a past disaster occurred today.
A
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ﬁ  gure 4.4 are partially misleading, as spending on a major disaster typically 
is spread over more than one year.
We now proceed to discuss projections of the catastrophe loss distribution 
for the entire United States, which will form the other half of the estimate 
of the Federal Government’s catastrophe loss exposure.
4.3.2      Data on the Aggregate Catastrophe Loss 
Distribution for the United States
The prospective catastrophe loss distribution for the United States is obvi-
ously diﬃcult to estimate precisely, but a rough sense of its character is 
essential for our exercise. We use two methods to project the distribution.
The ﬁ  rst method starts with the prospective distribution of catastro-
phe losses from a leading catastrophe modeling ﬁ  rm, Applied Insurance 
Research. We make adjustments to AIR’s distribution to account for unin-
sured losses (e.g., such as ﬂ  ood losses incurred in hurricanes).
The second method starts with ISO’s Property Claims Services database, 
which contains data on insured losses from US catastrophes spanning more 
than ﬁ  ve decades. We then adjust the historical ﬁ  gures to account for changes 
in property exposure and price levels. We also make adjustments to account 
for insurance penetration rates and uninsured losses. The methodology for 
these adjustments is described next.
In both methods, we restrict our attention to natural catastrophes, such 
as hurricanes and earthquakes. This leads to a conservative estimate (in the 
sense of being smaller than what is likely) of catastrophe exposure in two 
respects. First, we omit man-  made catastrophes such as terrorist attacks, 
oil spills, oil platform ﬁ  res and explosions, and nuclear power accidents. 
Second, our methodology almost certainly neglects to fully reﬂ  ect catas-
trophe exposure from ﬂ  ooding, since our data sources are focused on pri-
vately insured losses. While we have made adjustments to events in the 
data to reﬂ  ect the presence of uninsured ﬂ  ood losses, these adjustments 
are applied only to events that produced signiﬁ  cant insured losses (such as 
a tropical storm). Such a methodology understates ﬂ  ood exposure by fail-
ing to account for events with signiﬁ  cant ﬂ  ooding but insigniﬁ  cant wind 
involvement.
4.3.3      Aggregate Catastrophe Loss Distribution 
Based on the AIR Model
Catastrophe modeling is recognized globally as the standard technique for 
risk assessment and management. It is utilized by insurers and other ﬁ  rms 
exposed to catastrophic risk in pricing, risk selection and underwriting, loss 
mitigation, reinsurance decision making, and overall portfolio management. 
Applied Insurance Research Worldwide, which provided the catastrophic 
loss estimates discussed here, is one of the three global leaders in catastrophe 
modeling. Although catastrophe modeling began in the 1980s, the develop-Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    7 5
ment of the technology accelerated following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 
and the Northridge earthquake in 1994.
The AIR model is a stochastic simulation model that incorporates math-
ematical representations of the natural occurrence patterns and charac-
teristics of hurricanes, earthquakes, and other catastrophes.18 The model 
incorporates meteorological and seismological data, actuarial loss data, and 
information on property values, construction types, and occupancy classes 
(classiﬁ  cations that indicate what the structure is being used for, such as 
residential, retail, etc.). In most major geographical areas, the AIR model 
maps insurer exposure to catastrophic losses to the level of the individual 
building structure. Incorporated in the model are property characteristics 
and insurance coverage parameters. Thus, the model provides simulated loss 
distributions for individual insurers in ﬁ  nely divided geographical areas.
The structure of the AIR model is shown in ﬁ  gure 4.5. The simulations 
begin with event generation, which entails random generation of events in 
terms of their location, frequency of occurrence, and severity. The simula-
tions incorporate probability distributions based on historical data for each 
variable that deﬁ  nes the events. By sampling from these distributions, a large 
stochastic catalogue of simulated event scenarios is generated. This process 
is represented schematically in ﬁ  gure 4.6 for the simulation of hurricanes.
To estimate the damage potential of natural hazards, the model estimates 
their physical parameters, not only at the source but also at the sites of the 
aﬀected building inventory. The local intensity part of the model’s hazard 
module is designed to capture how intensity changes as the simulated catas-
trophe propagates or travels over the aﬀected area. Detailed scientiﬁ  c and 
geophysical data and algorithms are employed to model the local eﬀects of 
each simulated event.
The damage estimation or vulnerability component of the model super-
imposes the local intensities of each simulated event onto a database of 
exposed properties and estimates the expected level of damage to buildings 
and their contents. Loss estimates are based on region- speciﬁ  c damage func-
tions for many diﬀerent construction types and occupancies. Total damage 
estimates can be generated for the entire insurance industry, for individual 
insurer policy portfolios, or for individual buildings.
In the ﬁ  nal component of the model, insured losses are calculated by 
applying speciﬁ  c insurance policy conditions to the total damage estimates. 
Policy conditions include deductibles by coverage, coverage limits and sub-
limits, coinsurance, and other policy conditions. The output of the model is 
an estimated loss distribution for a speciﬁ  c insurance portfolio and location, 
often presented as an exceedance probability curve that plots the probability 
of exceeding various loss amounts.
For purposes of the present study, AIR provided expected average losses 
18. The discussion of the AIR model is based on Clark (2004).76        J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
and the higher percentiles, in aggregate and by occurrence, for hurricane, 
earthquake, winter storm, and severe thunderstorm. For all perils except 
earthquake, the estimates project insured losses, while the earthquake pro-
jection addresses insurable losses. As a result, AIR estimates of insured 
losses for perils other than earthquake will diﬀer from total losses because 
of deductibles, policy limits, and uninsured losses. Accordingly, we adjust 
losses for the hurricane, thunderstorm, and winter storm perils upward to 
account for the historical relation between insured losses and total property 
losses observed in our sample of catastrophes. The intention is, to the extent 
Fig. 4.5    The structure of the AIR simulation model
Fig. 4.6    Simulating a stochastic catalogue of storm eventsFederal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    7 7
possible, to adjust the AIR output to a basis consistent with the total loss 
estimates used in the previous section. However, we do not attempt to adjust 
the earthquake losses to reﬂ  ect uninsured economic costs absent from the 
AIR calculations. As a result, the loss estimates should be lower than those 
that would be fully consistent with the “total losses” used in the previous 
section. Hence, our ultimate projections of total loss exposure from the 
AIR model will be conservative in the sense of yielding estimates of federal 
exposure that are probably on the low side.
Table 4.2 summarizes the average annual aggregate and occurrence losses 
produced by adjusting the AIR losses as described. In addition, we list the 
ninety-  ninth percentile for all cases—the amount of loss corresponding to 
that expected with a frequency of once per century.19 The estimates show an 
annual aggregate expected average total loss of 35 to 43 billion dollars. The 
higher ﬁ  gure uses a shorter historical time series of hurricanes to account 
for the recent trend of more frequent and severe hurricanes. For all perils, 
there is a 1 percent chance of an annual loss of at least 273 to 282 billion 
dollars (without attempting the adjustment to hurricane and thunderstorm 
losses described previously).20
4.3.4      Aggregate Catastrophe Loss Distribution Based on PCS Data
In this section, we discuss the estimation of catastrophe loss distributions 
using the PCS data on insured catastrophe losses. The PCS reports losses 
at the state level, beginning in 1949, for various types of catastrophes. We 
adjust the data for changing exposure levels, as explained next, to provide 
estimates of the losses that would have resulted from the historical catas-
trophes recorded by the PCS if today’s property values had existed at the 
time of the events. Maximum likelihood estimation is used to ﬁ  t the adjusted 
losses to underlying parametric loss distributions. In this fashion, we can 
project expected losses and various percentiles to compare with the ﬁ  gures 
provided by AIR.
4.3.5    Data  Considerations
Property Claims Services, a division of the Insurance Services Oﬃce, com-
piles data on insured losses from catastrophes. Currently, the PCS deﬁ  nes 
a catastrophe as an event that causes $25 million or more in damages and 
19. Note that the ﬁ  gures for the percentiles for the all perils category do not contain adjust-
ments for the historical relationship between insured losses and total property losses, as we do 
not have detailed information on the composition of the all perils distribution. The average, 
however, does reﬂ  ect the adjustment.
20. This ﬁ  gure represents the ninety- ninth percentile of the distribution of the sum of insured 
losses for all perils except earthquake and insurable losses for earthquake. Since we do not have 
the composition of the all perils distribution, we cannot make the referenced adjustments with-
out making further assumptions. In the case of the average, however, the adjustments yielded 
an increase of about 50 percent; a similar impact on the ninety-  ninth percentile would suggest 
a ﬁ  gure above $400 billion.78        J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
aﬀects a signiﬁ  cant number of policy holders.21 The PCS loss estimates are 
for personal and commercial property along with vehicle losses covered by 
comprehensive coverage.22 The data are collected by canvassing the insur-
ance industry following major loss events and conducting supplemental ﬁ  eld 
research in some instances.23 The PCS maintains data from 1949 through 
the present, broken down by state and by type of event. The PCS analysis 
in this chapter focuses on the period from 1950 through 2006.
In this study, we develop models based on ﬁ  tting probability distributions 
Table 4.2  AIR based projections of US catastrophe loss exposure
    Aggregate   Occurrence
All perils (standard hurricane model)
  Expected  average  loss 35.2 21.6
  99th  percentile 272.6 234.6
All perils (Near-  term hurricane sensitivity)a
  Expected  average  loss 43.1 27.7
  99th  percentile 281.6 240.3
Hurricane (standard model)
  Expected  average  loss 19.9 16.8
  99th  percentile 109.0 97.4
Hurricane (near-  term sensitivity)
  Expected  average  loss 27.8 22.9
  99th  percentile 138.7 122.0
Earthquake
  Expected  average  loss 16.3 14.7
  99th  percentile 238.2 213.8
Winter storm
  Expected  average  loss 4.1 2.0
  99th  percentile 8.8 5.5
Severe thunderstorm
  Expected  average  loss 11.2 2.8
  99th  percentile   19.7   10.3
Note: Perils include hurricane, earthquake, winter storm, severe thunderstorm, and implicitly, 
ﬂ  ood. Hurricane expected average loss scaled by 47.7 percent insured- to- total- loss ratio. Severe 
thunderstorm expected average loss scaled by 74.3 percent insured-  to-  total-  loss ratio. Winter 
storm expected average loss scaled by 55.6 percent insured-  to-  total-  loss ratio. Amounts in bil-
lions of dollars. An occurrence loss is the largest loss from a single simulated event in a given 
year, and the aggregate loss is the sum of losses from all simulated events in a given year.
aNear-  term hurricane sensitivity uses a shorter historical time series of hurricanes to account 
for the recent trend of more frequent and severe hurricanes.
21. The monetary threshold used by the PCS to deﬁ  ne a catastrophe has been adjusted over 
time. From 1949 to 1981, the dollar threshold was $1 million; from 1982 to 1996, the threshold 
was $5 million; and since 1997, the threshold has been $25 million.
22. Auto losses generally represent 10 percent or less of total losses from catastrophes (e- mail 
from Gary Kerney of the PCS).
23. The PCS generally combines two methods to develop the best estimate of insured catas-
trophe losses. First, the PCS conducts conﬁ  dential surveys of insurers, agents, adjusters, public 
oﬃcials, and others to gather data on claim volumes and amounts. The PCS analyzes the data 
and combines it with trend factors to determine a loss estimate. The PCS also maintains a 
database containing information on the number and types of structures for every US state. Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    7 9
to the PCS data. We then estimate the loss quantiles to measure exposure 
to loss from various perils.
Prior to ﬁ  tting probability distributions, it is important to adjust the PCS 
loss data for changes in the value of property exposed to loss. The reason for 
this adjustment is that the value of property exposed to loss in the United 
States expanded dramatically during the period from 1949 through 2006, 
both from growth in the housing stock and price appreciation. Consequently, 
events from prior decades would be likely to cause much greater damages 
if they occurred today. To adjust the data for changes in property values, 
we created an exposure index for each state using the US Census Bureau’s 
decennial Census data on housing values.24 Values for years between the 
decades are calculated based on logarithmic interpolation; values for 2001 
to 2006 are calculated based on the annual growth rate that prevailed from 
1990 to 2000. This series gives the aggregate value of owner- occupied homes 
for each state in nominal dollars, so an increase in these ﬁ  gures over time 
represents both more houses being built and increases in the price level. The 
index is computed simply as the ratio of the 2006 value in a given state to 





























Then, the nominal loss value reported by the PCS for a given catastrophe 
in a given year and state is multiplied by the value of the exposure index for 
that year and state. This is an estimate of the losses a past catastrophe would 
cause if it occurred today, considering present price levels and the size of 
exposed infrastructure.25
Because the PCS focuses on insured losses from catastrophic events, we 
also adjust the PCS data to estimate the total (insured and uninsured) losses 
from each event. These adjustments diﬀer by peril, because the proportion 
Using that information, the PCS can estimate the number of insurable risks in a speciﬁ  c geo-
graphic area. Combined with survey information, the structure data forms the basis for the 
PCS damage estimates. For large or unusual events, the PCS resurveys the aﬀected insurers to 
obtain updated information. The PCS estimation methodology is described in more detail in 
Property Claims Services (2006).
24. The series used is: H024, AGGREGATE VALUE. Universe: speciﬁ  ed owner-  occupied 
housing units, deﬁ  ned by the Census Bureau as the “total number of owner occupied housing 
units described as either a one family home detached from any other house or a one family 
house attached to one or more houses on less than 10 acres with no business on the property. 
The data for ‘speciﬁ  ed’ units exclude mobile homes, houses with a business or medical oﬃce, 
houses on 10 or more acres, and housing units in multi-  unit buildings.”
25. The use of a housing value index implicitly assumes that the value of commercial prop-
erty and automobiles exposed to loss has expanded at the same rate as the value of residential 
property. Because population growth in a geographical region is likely to be accompanied by 
corresponding growth in commercial activity and the number of automobiles, this is likely to be 
a reasonable assumption. The use of housing values implicitly assumes that the value of land as 
a proportion of total housing value remains more or less constant over time. This assumption is 
potentially important, because storm damages are to structures and other property rather than 
to land, whereas the value of land is incorporated in the value of the housing stock.80        J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
of property covered by insurance varies signiﬁ  cantly by peril. For example, 
earthquake insurance take-  up rates in California are substantially smaller 
than homeowners insurance take-  up rates in the Southeast. These adjust-
ments are described in detail next.
For hurricane/ tropical storm, thunderstorm, and winter storm losses, we 
scale up the losses by a constant factor—the inverse of the ratio of insured 
to total loss for the corresponding peril in our federal expenditure sample 
(with NFIP losses not included in the insured ﬁ  gure).
Similarly for earthquakes, we use known take-  up rates for earthquake 
insurance since 1996 for California (available from the California Depart-
ment of Insurance) and project earlier take-  up rates based on the relation-
ship between annual California earthquake premium data (also from the 
California Department of Insurance), California aggregate housing value, 
and the known take-  up rates since 1996.26 We apply the inverse of these 
known and estimated take-  up rates to the PCS insured earthquake loss for 
the year it occurs to get a total loss ﬁ  gure.
4.3.6    Statistical  Methodology
To estimate an aggregate annual claims distribution, we use a Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT) inversion method. The approach requires separate esti-
mates of the severity of loss and annual frequency of occurrence distribu-
tions for each speciﬁ  c peril. We then compound these estimates to produce 
distributions of aggregate annual claims by peril and for all catastrophes.
Thus, the estimation has ﬁ  ve phases:27
1.  Estimate the severity of loss and annual frequency distributions sepa-
rately for each of the major catastrophe perils using maximum likelihood 
estimation.
2.  Discretize the severity distribution by dividing the full range of pos-
sible loss into equal segments and placing all the probability within a seg-
ment at its midpoint.
3. Apply the FFT to the discretized severity distribution to obtain its 
characteristic function.
4.  Transform this characteristic function using the estimated frequency 
26. Take-  up rates since 1996 are from the California Department of Insurance (http:/  /  www
.insurance.ca.gov/ 0250- insurers/ 0600- data- reports/ 0100- earthquake- cov- exp/ ). Annual earth-
quake premium data were obtained by fax from Richard Roth Jr. at the California Department 
of Insurance.
27. The reason for applying the Fast Fourier Transform approach is that the total claims 
distribution cannot be computed by convoluting the severity random variables and then com-
pounding the convolutions with the frequency distribution for most realistic frequency and 
severity distributions. However, the total claims distribution can be recovered by computing and 
then inverting the characteristic function. The FFT approach is discussed in Klugman, Panjer, 
and Willmot (2004). The severity distributions are discretized using the rounding method on 
4,096 segments of $100 million of loss. Any further tail probability, corresponding to losses 
exceeding $409.6 billion (number of segments • loss per segment), is placed on the last point of 
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distribution, yielding the characteristic function of the aggregate annual 
claims distribution.
5.  Apply an inverse FFT to recover the aggregate annual claims distri-
bution functions.28
For ﬁ  tting the severity of loss data, three diﬀerent distributions are used, 
which have been shown to provide good models of loss distributions in prior 
research (e.g., Cummins et al. 1990; Cummins, Lewis, and Phillips 1999). 
The distributions—the lognormal, the Pareto, and the Burr 12—are speci-
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We use the Poisson distribution, speciﬁ  ed as follows, to ﬁ  t the annual 
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4.3.7    Results
Summary statistics on catastrophe losses are presented in table 4.3, which 
have been adjusted for changes in housing exposures, both from growth in 
the housing stock and price level increases (but not to account for diﬀerences 
between insured losses and total losses). All data are from the PCS. Hur-
ricanes have the highest average and median loss severity at $8.8 billion and 
$1.2 billion, respectively. Hurricanes also have the highest standard deviation 
of loss. As expected, the observed losses are highly skewed for all perils.
The trends in the total number of catastrophic events and the total insured 
losses are shown in ﬁ  gure 4.7. The loss amounts have been adjusted to 2006 
property values, and catastrophes that would not have caused at least $25 
million in losses at 2006 property value levels have been deleted for purposes 
of preparing this ﬁ  gure. Even though Hurricane Katrina was the largest 
loss event recorded during the sample period in nominal dollars, based on 
28. This implicitly assumes that losses from catastrophe perils such as hurricanes, tornadoes, 
and earthquakes are statistically independent. The calculation utilizes the result that the charac-
teristic function of the sum of independent random variables is the product of the characteristic 
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the housing value-  adjusted loss data, there were ﬁ  ve previous events of 
approximately equal or greater magnitude. In 1950, a major wind and thun-
derstorm event caused substantial property losses from Maryland to Maine. 
If a similar event occurred at present, the estimated losses would be greater 
than $227 billion. In 1954, Hurricane Carol caused major damage ranging 
from New Jersey to Maine, with particularly large losses in Massachusetts 
and New York. The same year, Hurricane Hazel caused devastating losses 
ranging from South Carolina to New York. If those storms occurred today, 
it is estimated that Carol and Hazel would cause losses of $132 billion and 
$125 billion, respectively. A storm of the magnitude of Hurricane Gloria, 
which struck several northeastern states in 1985, would cause estimated 
losses of $65 billion if it occurred today. By contrast, insured losses from 
Hurricane Katrina were “only” $44 billion.
Parameter estimates for the various distributions and perils are shown in 
table 4.4, along with log-  likelihood function values. Estimates are shown 
both for insured and total losses. The last column of the table shows the 
best- ﬁ  tting distribution based on an approximate likelihood ratio test.29 The 
Pareto provides the best ﬁ  t for all perils except earthquake.
29. The likelihood ratio test results are only approximate, because the distributions esti-
mated are not nested in the sense that they can be obtained by imposing parameter restric-
tions on the distribution with the largest number of parameters. The signiﬁ  cance tests are 
based on a chi-  square distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The likelihood test statistic is 
2 • [log(L:distribution 1) –   log(L: distribution 2)] for pairwise tests of the distributions.
Fig. 4.7    PCS aggregate insured loss: Threshold of $25 million by event
Note: Figures are adjusted at the state level by our 2006 exposure index. This index captures 
both price- level changes and changes in the size of the housing stock. The intent is to estimate 
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As an example of one of the estimated distributions, the severity 
distribution of total losses from hurricanes and tropical storms is shown 
in ﬁ  gure 4.8. The likelihood ratio results show that the Pareto provides the 
best ﬁ  t to this set of data but not at a high level of statistical signiﬁ  cance. 
The graph bears this out but suggests that all three distributions ﬁ  t the data 
reasonably well, with the Pareto and Burr 12 perhaps overestimating the 
probability in the tail of the distribution. In ﬁ  gure 4.9, we present the annual 
aggregate claims distribution of total losses for all perils. These distributions 
are not directly estimated from the data. They are derived by compounding 
the separately estimated severity and frequency distributions for each indi-
vidual peril through the FFT method described previously. Due to computa-
tional limitations, all three distributions are capped at $409.6 billion, leading 
to underestimation of probability in the tail of the distribution.
Table 4.5 presents the means and upper percentiles of the estimated sever-
ity of loss distributions for the models whose parameters are shown in table 
4.4. The percentiles shown are the 50th, the 75th, the 90th, the 95th, the 99th, 
and the 99.9th. The latter three percentiles would correspond to event “return 
periods” of twenty, one hundred, and one thousand years, respectively.
In table 4.6, we present annual aggregate losses by peril and for all per-
ils (hurricanes, earthquakes, wind and thunderstorms, and winter storms) 
combined. For all perils, we project an expected annual insured loss range 
of 24 to 35 billion dollars and a total loss range of 39 to 48 billion dollars. 
The ninety-  ninth percentiles of the insured and total loss distributions are 
181 to 310 billion dollars and 272 to 337 billion dollars, respectively. These 
estimates suggest very large exposure to catastrophic losses for both the 
government and the insurance industry.
4.4      Estimated Annual Losses and Projected Liabilities
The AIR model projects expected annual catastrophe total losses of 35 to 
43 billion dollars; this is roughly comparable to the projections from the PCS 
data, which indicate annual average losses of 39 to 48 billion dollars. For 
the ninety- ninth percentile, the AIR model indicates insurable loss of 273 to 
282 billion dollars, which is again comparable to the total loss ﬁ  gures from 
the PCS methods—which indicate a range from 272 to 337 billion dollars, 
depending on the distribution chosen.
Reasonable estimates of the recent relation between federal aid and losses, 
based on the analysis presented, range from 30 percent to 50 percent—with 
ﬁ  gures at the higher end of the range supported by generosity observed in 
recent events such as the 2005 hurricanes and by the aggregated ratios of aid 
to losses over the period. It is true that the aggregates are skewed to some 
degree by the larger events that have happened in recent years, but even a 
straight average, by event, of the ratio of aid to loss yields a ﬁ  gure in excess 
of 30 percent.Fig. 4.8    Hurricane/  tropical storm occurrence severity: Total loss
Note: The data used in this estimation were adjusted at the state level by our 2006 exposure 
index. This index captures both price-  level changes and changes in the size of the housing 
stock. The intent is to estimate the losses a past disaster would cause if it occurred today.
Fig. 4.9    All perils annual aggregate claims: Total loss
Note: The data used in this estimation were adjusted at the state level by our 2006 exposure 
index. This index captures both price-  level changes and changes in the size of the housing 
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Thus, our analysis suggests an expected annual federal exposure in the 
neighborhood of 10 to 25 billion dollars, with the exposure in a bad year (once 
in a century) in the neighborhood of 80 billion to about 170 billion dollars.30
These ﬁ  gures have two signiﬁ  cant aspects. First, even the low end of our 
30. These ranges are rounded ﬁ  gures computed by multiplying the lower bound of our esti-
mates of expected annual catastrophe losses by the lower bound of observed federal aid ratios, 
30 percent, and the higher bound of our estimates by the higher bound of observed federal 
aid ratios, 50 percent.
Table 4.6  Expected loss and upper percentiles of aggregate annual claims distributions (values 
in billions of dollars)
Percentiles
Catastrophe type   Loss type   Mean   50.0   75.0   90.0   95.0   99.0   99.9
Lognormal
Hurricane Insured 12.5 2.0 9.3 29.6 56.7 175.8 391.5
Total 22.2 4.3 19.2 58.8 108.1 275.2 409.4
Earthquake Insured 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 4.5 26.7
Total 1.8 0.0 0.0 2.5 7.4 36.1 165.6
Wind and thunderstorm Insured 8.4 7.4 10.2 13.7 16.4 24.0 41.1
Total 11.4 10.0 13.8 18.5 22.2 32.4 55.4
Winter storm Insured 2.8 1.1 3.1 6.7 10.5 24.7 67.8
Total 5.1 2.0 5.6 12.2 19.0 44.4 120.6
All perils Insured 23.6 14.4 23.7 43.9 70.0 180.6 355.8
Total 39.4 23.5 41.7 81.7 128.4 271.8 388.4
Pareto
Hurricane Insured 16.7 1.5 7.7 34.1 84.4 324.3 409.4
Total 24.5 3.1 15.1 60.9 134.4 383.7 409.4
Earthquake Insured 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 8.1 246.1
Total 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 6.5 60.2 409.4
Wind and thunderstorm Insured 9.5 7.6 10.9 15.7 20.3 39.1 117.6
Total 12.8 10.3 14.7 21.2 27.4 52.5 152.4
Winter storm Insured 4.2 1.0 3.1 7.8 14.4 54.5 249.0
Total 7.0 1.9 5.6 14.0 25.6 91.5 316.9
All perils Insured 28.3 14.4 25.4 55.5 101.7 268.6 390.1
Total 42.2 22.8 42.3 92.3 155.4 315.2 397.9
Burr 12
Hurricane Insured 18.9 1.1 6.9 38.4 104.1 388.9 409.4
Total 25.8 2.4 13.2 64.4 152.8 409.4 409.4
Earthquake Insured 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 15.1 409.4
Total 2.2 0.0 0.0 2.7 8.0 41.6 254.2
Wind and thunderstorm Insured 13.0 7.8 12.5 22.2 34.9 104.7 306.1
Total 17.0 10.5 16.9 29.8 46.4 132.2 330.5
Winter storm Insured 6.5 0.8 2.9 9.8 23.1 125.9 395.8
Total 9.7 1.6 5.2 17.2 38.8 176.4 409.4
All perils Insured 34.5 15.3 31.5 78.5 142.1 309.7 397.3
    Total   47.8   24.1  49.6  114.4  187.1  337.1  401.1Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    8 9
expected estimate is substantially higher than current regular appropria-
tions. Second, the projections are accurate enough to be used for determin-
ing the size of regular appropriations. As Holtz-  Eakins (2005, pp. 18–19) 
states, “Many analysts believe that current federal budget procedures can 
lead to inappropriate evaluations of the trade-  oﬀs involved in providing 
assistance and can reduce incentives for mitigation and recovery eﬀorts by 
state and local governments.” He continues that one option, instead of rely-
ing so heavily on emergency supplemental appropriations, is to “appropri-
ate money for disaster programs in regular appropriations bills in amounts 
equal to the expected funding need for each program” (Holtz-Eakins 2005, 
p. 19). One way of realizing this would be to simply require that the midpoint 
of our estimate range be budgeted in advance for disaster relief. Then, going 
forward, projections can be updated fairly easily each year to encompass 
improvements in catastrophe modeling, revised assumptions about disaster 
frequency and severity, or changes in expected relief generosity. By align-
ing policymaker incentives and allowing proper comparison of competing 
spending priorities, implementing such a system would reduce the substan-
tial future costs of disaster relief.31
Assuming our current system of disaster relief is left unreformed, we can 
compute the net present value of the liability to the Federal Government of 
disaster spending over a given time horizon (for purposes of comparison 
with the unfunded liability associated with other social programs). We take 
the midpoint of our estimate of expected annual spending, $17.5 billion. 
We assume growth in exposure equal to the long-  term trend (1950 to 2006) 
annual growth rate in the value of the US housing stock index, 9 percent. 
Currently, about $2 billion is set aside for disaster aid each year, and we 
assume this grows with nominal gross domestic product (GDP) based on 
the same 1950 to 2006 span, which is 7.1 percent. Using a 5 percent discount 
rate, the net present value of the liability over a seventy-  ﬁ  ve-  year horizon is 
$7.1 trillion. If we assume everything grows at the 5 percent discount rate, the 
NPV is $1.2 trillion. Over this same horizon, the trustees of Social Security 
project a shortfall with a NPV of $4.9 trillion.32
4.5    Concluding  Remarks
The tremendous growth in federal disaster spending observed over the 
twentieth century has continued in more recent years. The $82 billion in 
31. Of course, challenges arise when shifting to explicit recognition of expected disaster 
relief in the budget. In particular, bureaucratic motivations to overspend on particular disasters 
would have to be addressed. On the other hand, it is debatable whether an oﬃcial budgetary 
acknowledgment of this entitlement, based on current levels of generosity, would encourage 
or restrain further growth in generosity.
32. “The present value of future tax income minus cost, plus starting trust fund assets, minus 
the present value of the ending target trust fund amounts to –  $4.9 trillion for the OASDI pro-
gram” (see SSA [2006, p. 57]). Available at: http:/  /  www.ssa.gov/  OACT/  TR/  TR06/  .90        J. David Cummins, Michael Suher, and George Zanjani
emergency federal spending on Katrina and other proximate hurricanes 
in 2005 exceeded the ﬁ  scal year (FY) 2005 budget of all but ﬁ  ve govern-
ment agencies, as well as the total amount appropriated for the much-
  maligned Congressional earmarks.33 Our analysis shows that the expected 
annual expenditure on disaster assistance—an estimated 10 to 25 billion 
dollars—is quite signiﬁ  cant and could be even higher if more aggressive 
assumptions that put a greater weight on recent trends are used. While 
this estimate is obviously not precise, diﬀerent assumptions or methods 
seem unlikely to alter the basic inferences about the signiﬁ  cance of the 
annual cost.
The cost is indeed signiﬁ  cant: given the current approach to disaster relief 
funding, we project an “unfunded” liability for disaster assistance over the 
next seventy-  ﬁ  ve years comparable to that of Social Security. The current 
annual budget of FEMA falls far short of expected annual federal disaster 
assistance, most of which is ﬁ  nanced through supplemental appropriations 
on an “as needed” basis. Over the period from FY1989 to FY2006, FEMA’s 
Disaster Relief Fund received original appropriations for less than $15 bil-
lion while experiencing outlays of over $58 billion (Bea 2006).
This budgetary treatment may not be unusual, but the lack of transpar-
ency with respect to acknowledging the commitment and accounting for its 
size is unfortunate in at least two respects. First, the costs and beneﬁ  ts of 
the disaster assistance program currently cannot be weighed against other 
national priorities. Second, federal disaster policy itself cannot be opti-
mized without understanding the commitment and the dollars involved. 
For example, if a scaling back of the federal disaster assistance program is 
not politically realistic, federal subsidization of state and local mitigation 
expenditures may be in the taxpayers’ interest—at least in the short run. 
Our projections make explicitly incorporating expected relief spending in 
the regular budgeting process a real possibility. Doing so would force the 
informed decision making that will optimize relief, although such incorpo-
ration would have to be combined with careful consideration of spending 
authority and bureaucratic incentives to insure that spending is ultimately 
restrained.
In designing disaster relief policy, there are many important consider-
ations that we do not attempt to analyze. Notably, many have observed 
that disaster assistance embodies a “samaritan’s dilemma” in the sense of 
its presence encouraging development in high-  risk areas. Implicit in our 
approach is the notion that prior to probing the deeper implications of the 
economic incentives embedded in disaster relief policy, it makes sense to 
33. The agencies were Health and Human Services (HHS; Medicare), Social Security, 
Defense, Treasury (debt interest), and Agriculture (Winters 2006). The FY2005 earmarks 
totaled approximately $50 billion (CRS Appropriations Team 2006).Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk    9 1
ﬁ  rst ask how extensive it is. Thus, we have attempted to measure and docu-
ment the ﬁ  nancial extent of current policy, with the belief that reform and 
management must be informed by measurement.
We document that disaster assistance is a large and continuous liability to 
the Federal Government, which increases with the value of infrastructure 
exposed to catastrophes. Though we are accustomed to think of catastro-
phes as unpredictable, our analysis demonstrates that it is possible to fore-
cast expected future costs for disaster assistance. Knowing the magnitude 
of these ﬁ  gures can inform both the budgeting process and, ultimately, the 
design of disaster relief policy.
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